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claimed dealt too sternly with Russia. A policy more accommodative to Russian interests was intended to fix the dangerous drift between the two countries. ‗Reset' was supposed to achieve breakthroughs in strategic arms reductions, counter-proliferation, cooperation on Iran and North Korea, garner Russian assistance in Afghanistan, and increase cooperation between the two countries. However, despite paying for ‗Reset' through U.S. concessions on missile defense plans in Europe, the bilateral relationship has remained chilly. No breakthroughs have been made that could not have been made without ‗Reset' and Russia continues to be a spoiler for major international initiatives. This article offers a critical assessment of the most often cited accomplishments of ‗Reset,' and then gives a prescription for a new direction in United
States policy towards Russia.
AFTER RESET: A NEW STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH PUTIN'S RUSSIA
The ‗Reset' 1 was intended to improve relations between the United States and Russia after they had fallen to new lows during the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.
Perhaps just as important to the designers, the ‗Reset' was a break from the Bush administration's foreign policy, which critics claimed dealt too sternly with Russia. The main point was that a -smart power‖ 2 strategy more accommodative to Russian interests was to fix the -dangerous drift‖ between the two countries and lead to more positive relations. ‗Reset' was supposed to achieve breakthroughs in strategic arms reductions, counter-proliferation, cooperation on Iran and North Korea, garner Russian assistance in Afghanistan, and increase cooperation between the two countries. 3 The United
States paid for the ‗Reset' through concessions to Russia on missile defense plans in Europe, most notably the deferral of plans to put missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. 4 However, despite this and other costs to the United States, the bilateral relationship has remained chilly. No breakthroughs have been made that could not have been made without ‗Reset' and Russia continues to be a spoiler for major international initiatives. This article offers a critical assessment of the most often cited accomplishments of ‗Reset,' and then gives a prescription for a new direction in United States policy towards Russia. wanted, including: significant U.S. reductions (which they wanted in order to save money on maintaining their own stockpiles), elimination of persistent U.S. surveillance at their nuclear production facility (which they found to be too intrusive), and a tie between strategic offensive and defensive systems written into the agreement (which gives them the right to protest U.S. missile defense systems in Europe). And, while U.S. negotiators honored all of these Russian -red-lines‖, they seemed to have none of their own--as walking away from the 
New START

Northern Distribution Network
The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) 13 is oft-cited as a product of better relations with Russia caused by ‗Reset,' but the cause and effect between ‗Reset' and NDN is highly questionable. Actually, the ‗Reset' may have made negotiating the NDN harder by complicating talks with some of the Central Asian countries. This occurred because NDN relies on separately negotiated bilateral agreements between the United
States and the five Central Asian countries, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Russia that provide several overland and air transport routes from Europe to Afghanistan (including a route that goes completely around Russian territory.) Therefore, transport through Russian territory is a single piece of a larger tapestry, and as with the other participants, the deal with Russia was entirely a business arrangement that needed no ‗Reset' rubric.
In fact, the U.S. had been quietly getting support in Afghanistan from Russia and Russian companies long before the ‗Reset' came along.
By sheer coincidence, the ‗Reset' was occurring at the same time as the U.S.
was negotiating the NDN, which as it turned out, complicated negotiations with Central Russian. 17 Russia clearly values its economic and military interests over atrocities in Syria and ‗Reset' has not changed this a bit.
Reasons for 'Reset' Failure
As well-intended as the ‗Reset' policy may have been, it has failed to produce results that could not have been accomplished with a less dramatic and public reversal from previous U.S. administration policies. One reason for failure was the false presumption that President Dmitriy Medvedev was a political player in his own right and that he would have a modernizing, moderating influence on Russian foreign policy.
However, this turned out to be a naïve misunderstanding of Russian political realities in which Putin and Medvedev were colluding to continue Putin's policies. 18 Medvedev's public announcement that he and Vladimir Putin had a prior agreement to return Putin to the Kremlin was quite a shock to many of Medvedev's supporters. 19 It was also a surprise to those in the United States that had apparently been banking on a less provocative interlocutor than the KGB-man, Putin. Putin's government has deemed that these are threats to Russian security and will counter any moves in these areas with diplomatic ferocity. 
